Ambiguity of moral judgment in politics: a Hegelian critique

Abstract

We intend to consider the political breadth of the Hegelian critique of subjective morality. It is known that, in Hegel's work, this is neither circums­tantial nor unimportant. Ludwig Siepp has rightly observed that the Hegelian critique of morality, both in the Phenomenology of Spirit and in Elements of the Philosophy of Right, is in keeping with his understanding of reality” (2013, p. 183). However, although the moral position is fundamental in the process of mediating freedom, insofar as it reveals itself, in its formal abstraction, identical to the Good that ought to be, it remains ambiguous with respect to the extension of its legitimacy. This misconception is even more problematic when moral po­sition becomes the principle for judging political action. Our understanding is that this extrapolation carries into the political field the misconception stemming from the very dialectics of morality. We have first to consider the role played by morality in Elements of the Philosophy of Right, and its critical limits before examining the related problem of the subsumption of politics by moral judgment.