THOMAS REID'S REPLY TO SKEPTICISM

Abstract

The paper presents and discusses how Thomas Reid's philosophy of common sense replies to the skepticism about the epistemic reliability of the faculties of mind. The hypothesis is that Reid responds to the skeptical chal­lenges with three arguments. First, he shows why it is impossible to prove the reliability of the faculties of mind and why philosophical investigations might start by accepting the truth of beliefs arising from these faculties. Secondly, Reid notes the inconsistency in arbitrarily choosing one of these faculties as the only source of true beliefs. Authors who, for example, choose consciousness as the only source of reliable knowledge, only reinforce the claim that all faculties of mind are equally reliable. Thirdly, if the faculties of the mind work properly, that is, if our mind is not affected by any disorder or disease, there is no good reason to call them into question and to doubt the truth of their beliefs.