BERGSON’S CRITIQUE OF THE IDEA OF NOTHINGNESS AND OF THE QUESTION WHY THERE IS SOMETHING RATHER THAN NOTHING: A SKETCH OF A FORMAL RECONSTRUCTION

Authors

  • Tatsuya Murayama Université du Tohoku

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.20911/21769389v51n160p271/2024

Abstract

In Creative Evolution, Bergson criticized the problem of asking why there is something rather than nothing, judging it as a pseudo-problem. About a quarter of a century later, he briefly recapitulated this critique in an article titled “The Possible and the Real.” This recapitulation is not a mere summary, and its examination reveals the various elements that are difficult to discern in Creative Evolution, including Bergson’s adoption of the inconceivability prin­ciple, common among 17th-century philosophers, and his vigilance against the deceptive workings of ordinary language, akin to the philosophy of ordinary language. This paper reconstructs and examines this recapitulative version, reveal­ing a new argument against the problem and the traditional yet revolutionary character of Bergson’s philosophy.

Keyword: Bergson. Existence. Nothingness. Inconceivability Principle. Ordinary Language Philosophy.

Published

2024-08-31

How to Cite

Murayama, T. (2024). BERGSON’S CRITIQUE OF THE IDEA OF NOTHINGNESS AND OF THE QUESTION WHY THERE IS SOMETHING RATHER THAN NOTHING: A SKETCH OF A FORMAL RECONSTRUCTION. Síntese: Revista De Filosofia, 51(160), 271. https://doi.org/10.20911/21769389v51n160p271/2024