The limits of Artificial Intelligence in light of contemporary Phenomenology: Situated Intelligence and the Lifeworld

Abstract

The main objective of this article is to assert a fundamental distinction between human intelligence and artificial intelligence, based on Hubert Dreyfus’s argument developed in his work What Computers Can’t Do, and relating this argument to the Husserlian concept of Lebenswelt (lifeworld). As a starting point, the article will clarify what is meant by artificial intelligence and the distinctions between strong and weak AI. Following this, it will present the prevailing stance and conception among AI scientists, who relate the functioning of artificial intelligence to the human mind, and it will contextualize the emergence of this stance along with its main assumptions. Finally, Dreyfus’s critique will be presented, along with the influence of the philosopher Edmund Husserl on this critique, especially highlighting the concepts of situated intelligence and the lifeworld.

Keywords: Artificial intelligence, situation, relevance, context, lifeworld.